Will the War on Terror Ever End? by Mignot-Mahdavi, Rebecca
 La Revue des droits de l’homme
Revue du Centre de recherches et d’études sur les
droits fondamentaux 
Actualités Droits-Libertés | 2019
Will the War on Terror Ever End?
Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/6269
DOI : 10.4000/revdh.6269
ISSN : 2264-119X
Éditeur
Centre de recherches et d’études sur les droits fondamentaux
 
Référence électronique
Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, « Will the War on Terror Ever End? », La Revue des droits de l’homme [En
ligne], Actualités Droits-Libertés, mis en ligne le 10 mars 2019, consulté le 19 avril 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/revdh/6269  ; DOI : 10.4000/revdh.6269 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 19 avril 2019.
Tous droits réservés
Will the War on Terror Ever End?
Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi
A French version of the paper is available here
1 The question of the temporal scope of application of international humanitarian law (IHL)
is one of the most unsettled issue of IHL (or “the laws of war”, or “jus in bello”), while it
may be the most problematic in the context of contemporary endless wars. International
law  provides  insufficient  guidance  to  ascertain  the  end  of  non-international  armed
conflicts,  that  is  conflicts  opposing  governmental  forces  and  non-state  armed
groups.Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Additional
Protocol IIrelating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts do
not contain express provisions concerning the termination of NIACs. The exploitation of
thislegal grey areacan lead to wars endingupon annihilation of all members of the enemy
group; in other words, to potentially infinite conflicts in a context where the enemy in
question recomposes and metamorphoses in time and space.
2 Legal uncertainty on the end-point of armed conflicts and, hence, of the application of
IHL rests on four alternative theories on the end of armed conflicts (and, in particular for
this  short  analysis,  of  NIACs)  that  can  be  derived  from  theGeneva  Conventionsand
Additional Protocol II, from theirtravauxpréparatoiresbut also fromcase decisions, such as
the cornerstone decisionProsecutor v. DuskoTadic of October 2, 1995 (§70). Dustin Lewis,
Gabriella Blum and NazModirzadehconducted an in-depth analysis of the question in 2017
and define these four alternatives as follows:
3 “• The two-way-ratchet theory: as soon as at least one of the constituent elements of the
NIAC—intensity of  hostilities  or organization of  the nonstate armed group—ceases to
exist; 
4 • The no-more-combat-measures theory: upon the general close of military operations as
characterized by the cessation of actions of the armed forces with a view to combat; 
5 •  The  no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption  theory:  where  there  is  no  reasonable  risk  of
hostilities resuming; and 
6 •  The state-of-war-throwback theory:  upon the achievement  of  a  peaceful  settlement
between the formerly-warring parties.”
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7 Rather than considering these alternative theories as a list, I suggest to picture them as a
spectrum, on the extremities of which we find, on the one hand, the two-way ratchet
theory  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption  theory;  in  the
middle,  there would be the achievement of a peaceful settlement theory and the no-
more-combat-measures theory. The two-way ratchet theory offers the perspective of a
prompter end of  conflicts.  First  because it  includes a test  based on factual  elements,
which does not require for instance to wait for the subjective decision of the parties to
resume hostilities through a peaceful settlement, but rather an objective analysis of a
context  that  fulfils  or  not  the  criteria  that  initially  allowed the  classification of  the
conflict. Second, the end of the conflict should in principle be pronounced earlier than
under the other theories, for the simple reason that the conduct of hostilities – it is its
objective – shouldpractically reduce both the level of organization of a non-state armed
group but also (and in consequence of the reduced capacities of the parties) the intensity
of hostilities. Simultaneously, this theory does not require to wait for parties not to (be
able to) conduct combat measures at all. In light of these elements, under the two-ratchet
theory, the end of hostilities can potentially be identified sooner than according to the
two other theories in the middle of the spectrum, and even more than under the no-
reasonable-risk-of resumption theory. The latter features particularly uncertain limits as
it does not exclude to set a very high threshold to assess the absence of reasonable risk.
8 Yet,  the  no-reasonable-risk-of  resumption  theory  has  never  been  set  aside  by  the
different actors of international law. Without being explicitly referred to, it even comes
out nowadays from the idea that  the conflict  against  ISIS will  end only when all  its
members have been taken out. According to this viewpoint, the weakening of the enemies
armed forces – leading to the actual cessation of actions of the armed forces with a view
to combat – is insufficient. On the contrary, the idea is that all members of the enemy
group should be eliminated to obtain the determine that there is no reasonable risk that
hostilities resume; only then can the conflict be considered terminated.While the no-
more-combat-measures theory requires what we can call  the “defeat” of the enemy’s
armed forces (or “weakening” resulting on cessation of hostilities), such a perception of
armed conflicts awaits the “annihilation” of the enemy group members. Such a theory on
the end of armed conflicts, enacting what I call here “wars until annihilation”, if it is
adopted, would (II)  contradict the function of contemporary IHL to regulate (and not
prevent the resumption of) hostilities; and (III) generate an overlap between IHL and the
jus ad bellum. Before delving into these issues, I will start the analysis by a reminder of the
geopolitical and legal context in which I identified elements echoing the no-reasonable-
risk-of resumption theory (I). 
 
1./Wars Until Annihilation… of All Enemy Group
Members
9 The announcement of President Trump on 19 December 2018 that the US wouldwithdraw
its troops from Syria and following reactions from allies and scholars provide evidence of
the uncertainties on the end of armed conflicts. To justifyhis decision to bring US troops
back from Syria, President Trump emphasized the “large defeat” of ISIS. This declaration,
heavily commented as an erroneous analysis of reality, in fact did not necessarily mean
that the United States consider the organization completely eradicated. Rather, and this
second understand is corroborated byTrump’s State of the Union address,the observation
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was that, as of now, ISIS was incapable of mounting military operations in Syria that
could justify keeping troops in the framework of the armed conflict opposing the United
States to the said armed group. Hence, it seems that Trump followedeither a version of
the “no-more-combat-measure theory” - the enemy is so weakened that it cannot combat
anymore and the conflict ends – orat least a moderate version of the “no-reasonable-risk-
of-resumption theory” – the enemy is so weakened that there is no reasonable risk that
hostilities resume. 
10 Immediately  after  Trump’s  announcement,  somestate  officialsdissociated  themselves
from President Trump’s decision.UK Defence minister insisted thatISIS is  “very much
alive”,after  US  president  declaration  on  troop  withdrawal.  French  Defence
ministerFlorence Parly acknowledged that the group had been significantly weakened,
but said the battle was not over. On the aftermath of Trump’s announcement, she twitted
that the"Islamic State has not been wiped from the map, nor have its roots. The last
pockets of this terrorist organization must be defeated militarily once and for all."This
declaration, while not explicitly declaring commitment to a specific legal theory on the
end of armed conflicts, reveals a thought structure that indirectly reminds the language
of an extensive version of the “no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption theory” according to
whichNIAC ends when there is no reasonable risk of hostilities resuming. In fact, it would
not be surprising to anyone following closely the French counterterrorism strategy et
related (implicit) legal framework that such theory is the one followed by France. In the
absence of clearly articulated legal rationale, the following analysis must be read with
caution for  it  relies  upon a  study of  language,  which is  up to  French governmental
officials to specify or rectify. 
11 The 2017 French Strategic Review on Defence and National Security, in its section on
‘Rootedness  and  Dissemination  of  Jihadist  Terrorism’  (p.37),  insists  that  “jihadist
terrorism is going through a transformative phase that will not diminish its reach and the
danger it  represents for the forthcoming decade:  the main jihadist organizations will
decline in some areas, yet without disappearing, and their underpinning ideology will
persist”.  The text,  that will  later serve as the foundation for the law n° 2018-607 on
military programming adopted on 13 July 2018, explains that through their “operational
and  ideological  matrix,  where  the  know-hows  are  transmitted  from  generation  to
generation, the current jihadist organizations, Daech, Al Qaida and their several affiliates
managed to adapt and mutate despite the setbacks they have suffered”. Likewise, the
annexed  report to  the  law  on  military  programming  insists  that  jihadist  terrorism
because of its “complexity and geographical spread”,“recomposes and extends itself to
new regions of the world’. For this reason, the 2017 Strategic Review and 2018 Law on
Military Programming aim to reinforce the “intelligence and anticipation” capacities in
order to be able to act “upstream and downstream of crises, including in new spaces of
confrontation, and to foster France’s capacity to play a driving and federating role in
strengthening a European defence, through a proactive strategy”. The terminology used
in these official  and legal  documents,  accompanied by the declaration of  Minister of
Defence Florence Parly in the aftermath of the announcement of US troops withdrawal,
suggests  thatFrance  might  consider  that  the  conflict  it  intends  to  carry  (against  all
jihadist groups?) has to persist as long as these groups exist, re-emerge and recompose
themselves. 
12 If  this  posture  indeed  turns  out  to  be  the  official  French  position,  and  that  France
considers  its  military actions to be part  of  an armed conflict  under IHL,  the French
Will the War on Terror Ever End?
La Revue des droits de l’homme , Actualités Droits-Libertés
3
operational and legal logic would gobeyond the US rationale – recently affirmed at least
concerning Syria and reminding the rationale on the end of conflicts framed as follows
underthe Obama administration:
13 “there will come a tipping point – a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and
operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no
longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al
Qaeda as  we know it,  the  organization that  our  Congress  authorized the military  to
pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed. At that point, we must be able to say to
ourselves that our efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against al
Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort against individuals who
are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda”.
14 Before a different legal theory on the end of armed conflicts is officially and explicitly
adopted by anyone, among states or scholars, it seems important to try and identify what
such an approach legally implies. 
 
2./Wars until Annihilation…of Modern IHL?
15 What would wars of annihilation imply for modern IHL?First and foremost, it should be
underlined that in the context of intense legal uncertainty on the end of armed conflicts,
one  cannot  convincingly  conclude  that  one  theory  rather  than  another  is  blatantly
misguided or clearly violates the law. However, by identifying the consequences that a
choice of a theory over another triggers, it is possible to confront these consequences to
other norms of IHL or to the logic or function of this legal framework; as a result, it is also
possible  to  deduce  whether  this  choice  is  savvy  or  even,  on  the  normative  level,
desirable.To figure this out, onepreliminary question to ask is what war consists in when
it persists after the enemy group has been defeated –in other words, once it is effectively
incapable to mount military operations.Under this scenario, the un-terminated conflict
could  not  materially  consist  in  conducting  operations  against  individuals  directly
participating  in  hostilities:  by  definition,  there  would  not  be  such  thing  as  active
hostilities.
16 Instead of targeting individuals directly participating in hostilities,  the conflict’s  goal
would  be,  according  to  the  no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption  theory  and  the
abovementioned logic of “anticipation”, to prevent capacity building of the enemy group.
Concretely, one can imagine that military operations would take the form of manhunt
and interception of individuals – through capture or kill – when they pose a threat. Such
threat could be established if they still embrace the ideology of the enemy group and
carry a hostile mindset, including the intention to rebuild the operational capacities of
the group.
17 Such  practice,  although  it  derives  from  one  of  the  legal  options  on  the  end  of
hostilities,would entail to accept conceptual shifts in IHL. Let us succinctly describe the
two main shifts. First of all, if the strength of the enemy group has been successfully
diminished,  there are no direct participants in hostilities,  traditionally understood as
individuals carrying acts supporting the non-state armed group. Yet, under the law of
NIACs,there is no combatancy membership and privilege for non-state actors under IHL
that would allow governmental forces to attack at any point in time the “members” of the
enemy non-state armed group.  Rather,  article  3  common to the Geneva Conventions
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limited  military  actions  of  governmental  forces  to  persons  directly  participating  in
hostilities:  an individual  is  targeted for  the acts that  he perpetrates  only when they
amount to direct participation in hostilities and, above all, only as long , and for such
time as  he does directly  participate in hostilities.  A war until  annihilation,  once the
enemy’s forces are so diminished that hostilities are interrupted, would target individuals
who by definition do not directly participate in hostilities but feature a hostile mindset.
The abovementioned definition of  direct  participation in hostilities  derived from the
Geneva Conventions (and not explicitly included in the text of the Conventions) would
not allow such practice. 
18 Such  practice,  to  be  valid,  would  require  to  accept  (an  extensive  version  of)  the
continuous combat function (CCF), established by the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law
(pp.34-35). This notion expands targeting possibilities of state armed forces in NIACs in
that it attributes a quasi-combatant status (quasi because not associated with a privilege
of  combatancy)  to  individuals  whose  affiliation  to  the  non-state  armed  group  is
established.  This  notion  thereby  creates  a  distinction  that  did  not  exist  until  then
between civilians spontaneously and punctually directly participating in hostilities on the
one  hand,  and  members  of  non-state  armed  forces  on  the  other  hand.  This  (quasi)
combatant function creates the possibility to target its owner outside moments of direct
participation in hostilities.
19 Carrying out wars until annihilation, post-incapacitation of the enemy group to conduct
military operations, would necessarily require to embrace this emerging legal notion of
continuous combat function and to define it in a flexible, or even extensive way. Indeed,
the ICRC specifies that it is not sufficient for an individualto carry a support function:
continuous combat function is established only if the function consists in engaging in
combat.  An  individual  who  is  “recruited,  trained  and  equipped  by  such  a  groupto
continuously  and directly  participate  in  hostilities  on its  behalf  can beconsidered to
assume a continuous combat function even before he or shefirst carries out a hostile act”
(p.34). In order to legally justify targeting individuals post-incapacitation of the enemy
group under the CCF framework would imply to stretch the notion of continuous combat
function  and  come  up  with  a  version  referring  to  the  former continuous  direct
participation  in  hostilities  and/or  to  the  intention  of  continuously  participating  in
forthcoming hostilities once the operational capacities are rebuilt and allow the group to
conduct operations again. 
20 The second conceptual and paradigmatic shift that wars until annihilation would entail is
even more systemic as it pertains to the very function of international humanitarian law:
regulating the conduct of hostilities. Waiting for the eradication of all members of the
enemy group and pursue the conflict seeking that end goal, although the enemy group
has been sufficiently weakened or although it  does not  actually conduct any combat
measures, would immediately deprive IHL of such function of regulation of hostilities. The
Geneva Conventions were envisaged as regulating conflicts, through a series of rules and
principles  seeking  a  balance  between  simultaneously  activating  authorisations  and
limitations to the amount of violence in conflicts. Without hostilities to regulate,  the
function  attributed  to  the  norms  of  IHLwould  be  diluted  in  an  abstract  and  vague
aggregate of operations seeking to prevent the resumption of hostilities. 
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3./Wars until Annihilation…of the Divide between Ad
Bellum and In Bello?
21 Maintaining the characterization of NIAC after the enemy group has been incapacitated
to track individuals who essentially pose a continuous imminent threatcreates a great
overlap between jus in bello and jus ad bellum.This is true because in the past decade,
active states in the war on terror, in particular the United States, joined by the United
Kingdom and Australia, but also some scholars – first and foremost Sir Daniel Bethlehem–
put pressures on thejus ad bellum, and in particular on the right of individual self-defence.
The proposed version of the right of individual self-defence, suggests that article 51 of the
United Nations Charter establishing this right should be applied to continuous imminent
threats. More importantly and even more debated (considering the wide acceptance of a
restrained version of imminence, based on the Caroline case, when the threat is “instant”
and “overwhelming”), the proposed version supports that the imminence of the threat
could be deduced from an accumulation of  events  revealing “a concerted pattern of
continuing armed activity” and when there is an “objective basis for concluding that
those threatening or perpetratingsuch attacks are acting in concert”. 
22 Today, when states decide to withdraw their troops and terminate hostilities under the
jus in bello have at their disposal an extensive interpretation of the jus ad bellum which, if
it  remains contentious,  was sufficiently firmly and astutely articulated by the Obama
administration to legitimize an operational practice and strategical choice characterized
by  anticipation.  Even without  accepting  the  most  extensive  version  of  the  proposed
revisionist  framework of  the jus  ad  bellum,  and as  mentioned above,  the concepts  of
imminence of the threat and preemptive self-defence are widely accepted. 
23 In this legal context, the idea of war until annihilation based on an extensive version of
the no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption theory that would consist in hunting down until
annihilation all  surviving members of the enemy group, in the framework of a NIAC,
resembles the idea to target individuals in self-defence in anticipation of the continuous
imminent threat they represent. What surfaces here is a context of legal torment where
pressures are put on the one hand on the jus ad bellum to make it a suitable framework for
targeting  individuals,  not  because  of  an  identified armed  attack  in the  making,  but
because of the threat they represent as members of the jihadist network; and on the
other hand on the jus in bello to use it as a legitimizing tool with no expiry date for
targeting  individuals,  not  because  of  their  direct  participation  in  hostilities,  but  to
prevent the resumption of those hostilities. This context of legal torment generates a
confused admixture of in bello/ad bellum that enables infinite extraterritorial use of force. 
24 It has been possible to trace this admixture of in bello/ad bellum in official discourses of
the Obama administration, but also in scholarship, including recently in France in the
brief  analysis  conducted  by  Jean-Baptiste  JeangèneVilmer,  director  of  the  French
Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School (IRSEM), but writing in his personal
capacity  in  his  article  « L’élimination  ciblée  des  terrorists  est  à  employer  avec
parcimonie ». He explains that there are reasons to “defend the targeted killing of high
value targets posing an imminent and demonstrable threat to national security, in a context
of armed conflict” (italics added). The mixed terminology could derive from a mistake but
it seems important to refer back to the legal and practical consequences that were just
explored and, by the same token, to underline the emergence of the confusion even in
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papers  explicitly  aiming to clarify  the question of  the legal  framework applicable  to
extraterritorial operation. 
25 In conclusion, these developments diagnosed under what legal and practical conditions
an unlimited use of force can arise in the counterterrorism context. We tried to identify
the grey zones of international humanitarian law and related degrees of uncertainty.
Besides, in a context of general silence in France on the interpretation of the applicable
legal frameworks to the extraterritorial use of force in the counterterrorism context, it is
with caution that French official rhetoric was analysed and a hypothesis framed on the
theory possibly chosen regarding the end of conflicts. This analysis, that awaits to be
rectified where necessary,  allowed to assess that France might endorse the idea that
conflicts end when there is no reasonable risk of resumption of hostilities. Exploring this
hypothesis then consisted in identifying the legal consequences that such perspective
would  entail:  first,  IHL  move  away  from  it  very  function,  that  is  the  regulation  of
hostilities, towards a function of prevention of conflict resurgence; second, the blurring
of distinction between jus ad bellum / jus in bello, that could lead on an à la carte, and thus
potentially unlimited, justification of the use of force.
26 It is not fortuitous that legal uncertainties on the end of armed conflicts emerge today as
a major problem. As soon as the participants in a conflict have a mutual intention to erase
each other from the surface of  the earth,  the use of  force enters  in an exacerbated
temporal dimension. A hypothesis to explain this socio-legal phenomenon is that this
legal  grey  zone  did  not  appear  to  be  problematic  until  now  because  the  desire  of
annihilation had not  been so  intense(ly  shared).  On the  contrary,  rules  of  IHL  were
created  to  regulate  conflicts  either  between equal  public  powers or  between  states  and
aspiring states willing to challenge the sovereign exercising its power over them to replace
it; none of which were motivated by a desire of annihilation, and all of which were acting
in an interstate paradigm and thereby,  preserved it.  The hypothesis  is  that  once we
depart  from this  premise to reach a new concrete scenario,  namely the use of  force
against  anti-statist  transnational  terrorist  networks,  attacking  public  forces  seek
annihilation of the enemy (and vice versa).This dynamic conceals heavy consequences.
This  blog  shows  that  such  conflicts,  as  being  regulated  by  norms  that  present
uncertainties catalysing extension, are potentially infinite. 
*
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RÉSUMÉS
The announcement of President Trump on 19 December 2018 that the US would withdraw its
troops from Syria and following reactions provide evidence of the uncertainties on the end of
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armed conflicts,  asa factual,  strategic and legal matter.The question of the temporal scope of
application of international humanitarian law (IHL) is one of the most unsettled issue of IHL,
while  it  may  be  the  most  problematic  in  the  context  of  contemporary  endless  wars.  In  the
aftermaths of  Trump’s announcement,  French Defence minister Florence Parly acknowledged
that the group had been significantly weakened, but said the battle was not over because the
"Islamic State has not been wiped from the map, nor have its roots.  The last pockets of this
terrorist organization must be defeated militarily once and for all."This declaration, while not
explicitly  declaring  commitment  to  a  legal  theory  on  the  end  of  conflicts,  deserves  special
attention as it reminds the language of the “no-reasonable-risk-of-resumption theory” according
to which non-international armed conflicts end (and IHL ceases to apply in relation to it) where
there is no reasonable risk of hostilities resuming. This theory, if  the threshold to assess the
absence of  reasonable  risk is  set  high –  achieved once all  members of  the enemy group are
annihilated – is the object of the present analysis.The goal of this blog, thereby, is not to attribute
a legal theory to Francethat it has not explicitly adopted, but to investigate whatdoing so would
entail. 
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